Following recent developments in the literature on axiomatic theories of truth, we investigate an alternative to the widespread habit of formalizing the syntax of the object-language into the object-language itself. We first argue for the proposed revision, elaborating philosophical evidences in favor of it. Secondly, we present a general framework for axiomatic theories of truth with 'disentangled' theories of syntax. Different choices of the object theory O will be considered. Moreover, some strengthenings of these theories will be introduced: we will consider extending the theories by the addition of coding axioms or by extending the schemas of O, if present, to the entire vocabulary of our theory of truth. Finally, we touch on the philosophical consequences that the theories described can have on the debate about the metaphysical status of the truth predicate and on the formalization of our informal metatheoretic reasoning.
§1. Truth, Syntax and Object theory. In the customary way of constructing axiomatic theories of truth, starting with an object theory O-usually a formal system capturing some portion of arithmetic-the language L O is expanded with a unary truth predicate T and O is extended with truth-theoretic axioms. Under a suitable coding for L O -expressions, the truth predicate then applies to names of sentences of L O in the form of terms of L O itself. Therefore primitive recursive functions and relations concerning strings of symbols of the language of O are represented in L O in the guise of expressions naturally interpreted over the mathematical domain of O.
In the wake of recent works of Richard Heck and Volker Halbach, this paper stands as a contribution towards a possible alternative to this common habit. In the rest of the present section we try to motivate the proposed reassessment by highlighting some unresolved issues traceable in the usual construction. 1 1.1. Informal metatheoretic reasoning. Volker Halbach in (Halbach 2011) expresses manifest uneasiness with the praxis of identifying the formal system S in which we talk about the syntax of the language L O of a system O and O itself. The typical situation, when axiomatic truth is concerned, regards the case in which O is a fragment of arithmetic which contains S as a subtheory:
Identifying numbers and expressions is a notational simplification at best, but in informal metatheoretic discussion the theory of syntax and the theory of natural numbers should be kept separate: expressions are not numbers. (Halbach, 2011, p. 316) In other words, in 'informal metatheoretic discussion' it is always possible for the working logician to look at the content of some expression e and determine whether it describes syntactic properties of the language of O or whether it refers instead to the subject-matter of O. Suppose O is a theory of arithmetic and consider for instance the operation (which we shall label¬) that given an expression of L O prepends to it the negation symbol '¬'. This operation belongs to our informal metatheory and in the customary way of formalizing the metatheory is expressed by a function¬ which is then represented in L O by a term ¬ . (x) for which ¬ . ϕ = ¬ ϕ holds in every model of O, with the notation . representing some fixed Gödel coding of expressions from L O . From the perspective of the theory O therefore, an expression concerning the syntax of L O is indistinguishable from one concerning its subject-matter. In contrast, in the language of the formal metatheory all statements are syntactic. Thus, from the point of view of our informal metatheory, we clearly distinguish between¬,¬ and ¬ . .
The theories that will be proposed in what follows, especially in section 3.4, will try to capture this all-present interplay between formal and informal components of our metamathematical reflection.
Generality.
A formal theory of truth, from Tarski onwards, 2 has to be applicable, sine contradictione, as widely as possible. For instance it has been argued in Horsten (2011) that the addition of an axiomatized truth predicate to epistemological or metaphysical theories could in some cases shed light on the explanatory power of the notion of truth. 3 For instance, let us define a mereological theory as a first-order theory formulated in the language of first-order logic augmented with a binary predicate • for 'overlapping' or alternatively for 'part-of', and which is strong enough to contain the so-called calculus of individuals (CI). 4 We might want to expand the language of our mereological theory M arithmetical object theories and employs restricted versions of syntactic induction, so the setting is slightly less general then the one presented below. It should also be noted that Heck attributes to Albert Visser several results contained in his paper. 2 Cfr. §1.3. 3 Horsten considers the case of Fitch's argument against weak verificationism and shows that the truth predicate, characterized by more than just the T-sentences, does play a substantial role in the argument. Cfr. Horsten (2011, pp. 86-91) . 4 For instance, as defined in Niebergall (2011) , CI is the first-order theory in L • , where • is a primitive predicate for overlapping, whose nonlogical axioms are (with a predicate for 'part-of' relation already definitionally introduced):
with a unary truth predicate and axiomatize it according to our needs. Now there is no consistent extension M of a mereological theory so-defined such that Robinson's arithmetic Q is interpretable in it. 5 Assuming that the strength of Q is the minimal requirement to develop a satisfactory theory of syntax up to diagonalization, there seems to be no way for M to develop its own syntax, and a separate axiomatization of the syntax for L • or L is particularly welcome.
1.3. Tarski . Surprisingly enough, Tarski's original presentation already displays several of the aspects of metamathematical reflection that Halbach's thesis emphasizes. In particular, Tarski characterized the metalanguage as containing . . . three groups of expressions: (1) expressions of a general logical kind;
(2) expressions having the same meaning as all the constants of the language to be discussed [. . .] ; (3) expressions of the structural-descriptive type which denote single signs and expressions of the language considered, whole classes and sequences of such expressions or, finally, the relations existing between them. (Tarski, 1936, §4, pp. 210-11) The description of the metalanguage is then completed by specifying the axiom system for it, compounded by . . . the general logical axioms which suffice for a sufficiently comprehensive system of mathematical logic, and the specific axioms of the metalanguage which describe certain elementary properties of the above structural-descriptive concepts consistent with our intuitions. (Ibid., §2, p. 173) According to Heck the construction outlined in the passages above seems to be that Tarski's project of providing metamathematics with a consistent notion of truth does not depend on the expressions of the structural-descriptive type-group (3) in the quotationbeing part of expressions of category (2). We agree on this interpretation.
The reasons behind a separate axiomatization of the syntax, in Tarski (1936) , seem to be deeply tied with the dimension of generality he wanted to give to his definition. The following passage calls to mind the content of the previous subsection:
In contrast to natural languages, the formalized languages do not have the universality which was discussed at the end of the preceding section. In particular, most of these languages possess no terms belonging to the theory of language, i.e. no expressions which denote signs and expressions of the same or another language or which describe the structural connexions between them (such expressions I call-for a lack of a better term-structural-descriptive). For this reason, when we investigate the language of a formalized deductive science, we must always distinguish clearly between the language about which we speak, as well as between the science which is the object of our investigation and the science in which the investigation is carried out. (ibid., §2, p. 167) This famed passage seems also to indicate that when the language L O of our object theory O does indeed contain expressions 'which denote signs and expressions of the same or another language or which describe the structural connexions between them', it would be natural for the object theory to contain the syntactic portion of the metatheory. This interpretation appears to be supported also by Tarski's more general description of the 'semantic conception of truth' contained in Tarski (1944, §9) , in which the abovementioned condition on the object language is explicitly made.
Tarski's picture of the metatheory thus embraces the possibility of a setting in which the syntactic component of the metatheory itself is not included in the object theory. This seems to leave room for the investigation of a setting in which syntax and mathematics are clearly distinguished. 6 Tarski aimed at a definition of truth in the metatheory, whereas in our approach truth will be taken to be a primitive concept characterized by suitable axioms. One might then wonder whether this difference can impinge on the motivations behind the project carried out here. 7 As it will be clear below, one of the goals of an axiomatization of Tarski's original picture of the metatheory is to isolate the different patterns of reasoning proper of our meatmathematical reflection which are coarsely identified in the usual construction. Therefore a setting in which the notion of truth is described by axioms renders the evaluation of the syntactic, truth theoretic and mathematical components of our metatheoretic reasoning easier. In a definitional approach, as in Tarski's original one, truth is reduced to other mathematical notions such as higher-order quantification: the impact of the semantic constituents of the metatheory would thus be dissolved in a richer mathematical structure.
As a matter of fact, the proposal that we are advocating will not be fully completed in this paper. Unlike Tarski, we will favor the arithmetization techniques, as the presentation of a brand new theory of expressions for truth-theoretic purposes would require the length of another paper. However, following Heck (2009) and Halbach (2011) , we will distinguish between a realm of syntactic objects and the domain of discourse of our object theory. Therefore expressions and numbers in our system are not the same kind of objects. We provide a concrete, sufficiently general, and hopefully accessible account of how axiomatic theories of truth with a detached theory of syntax can be constructed, of some of their properties and of the some ways in which they can be strengthened. We stick to the case of a classical axiomatization of the notion of truth for a first-order object theory O, and defer the treatment of the self-referential setting to future work. Before that, however, we consider further motivations, besides the one already singled out, for endorsing our proposed revision.
'Syntactic' and 'mathematical' schemas.
We assume some familiarity with the axiomatization of classical Tarskian truth as presented for instance in Feferman (1991) and Halbach (2011) . We begin with a sufficiently powerful object theory O formulated in the language L of arithmetic, 8 expand its language with a unary truth predicate, allowed to appear into the schemas of the object theory, and add compositional axioms of the form
6 For further insights on the exegesis of Tarski's work, also in relation with Gödel's theorems, see Nicolai (forthcoming) . 7 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting some clarificatory remarks on this matter. 8 Here by sufficiently powerful we mean the capability of developing its own syntax.
for each connective and quantifier of L , where the L -expression x ∧ . y stands for the term of L representing the operation of applying the conjunction symbol between the L -sentences represented by x and y. 9 Following Halbach (2011), we call the resulting theory CT, for 'compositional truth' when the object theory O is Peano Arithmetic, specifying otherwise the object theory (writing CT [O] ). We will occasionally refer to the theory CT as CT with the schema of induction restricted to formulae of L .
It is well-known that for various choices of the object theory O, for O finitely and schematically axiomatized, 10 the theory of truth CT [O] is strong enough to prove the so-called global reflection principle for O.
As immediate corollaries of Proposition 1.1, CT [O] will prove the consistency statement for O. By Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, CT[O] is thus nonconservative over O. In Heck (2009) , it is shown that the full deductive strength of CT is not needed to prove the global reflection principle for PA. In particular:
Proposition 1.2 is particularly striking: if we start with I 1 , expand its language with a predicate expressing truth and extend the theory with compositional axioms, we expect to gain some expressive or deductive power over our object theory. In this case however, we do not only obtain some increase in deductive power, but rather obtain a theory whose deductive strength is sufficient to prove the consistency of Peano arithmetic. CT[I 1 ], a fortiori, would thus prove the consistency of the theory I i for each i. What is crucial for our purposes is that Proposition 1.2 is only provable because the theory of syntax for L is considered to be part of the object theory itself. It is proved by formal induction on the length of the derivations in the object theory, which crucially employs the extension of the schemas in the object theory to formulas containing the truth predicate. In particular, we need the following instance of the induction of CT[I 1 ]:
where Proof PA (z) is some standard primitive recursive predicate expressing that 'z encodes a proof in a sentential calculus for PA' and end(z) is the primitive recursive function that outputs the (code of the) final formula of the proof encoded in z. However, in order to obtain the premise of (1), in particular the claim that the universal closure of each axiom of PA is true, we need another instance of the extended induction, namely,
where subn(z, x) is the numeral substitution function, representing within L O the operation of substituting the x-th numeral for the first free variable occuring in the formula represented by z. Now (1) and (2) are, in a sense, very different. (1) is carried out on syntactic objects, derivations within PA, whereas in (2) the induction is carried out over all substitutional instances of the formula encoded by z. It is worth noting the ambiguity that arises once again: technically speaking, both are instances of the induction of PA in the language L ∪ {T }, but it is clear that for our metamathematical concerns they are part of quite different kinds of argument. It is only because of the identification between syntax and object theory that the proof is possible in the case of CT. In the concluding section we will discuss this duplex nature of the induction schema of PA in the light of the so-called 'conservativeness argument' against deflationism raised in Horsten (1995) , Shapiro (1998) , and Ketland (1999) . As we shall see, the difference between 'syntactic' and 'mathematical' versions of the induction schema of PA is particularly relevant for that debate. In another sense, however, Theorem 3.4 is not surprising at all, as the truth predicate allowed into the 0 1 -induction scheme determines a 'collapse' of the arithmetical hierarchy, as formulas of any complexity are treated as atomic. This fact becomes more evident if we consider the case of set theory. Abusing a bit of the notation just introduced we call CT[KPω] the theory obtained from Kripke-Platek set theory plus the axiom of infinity by expanding L ∈ with constants c x for each element x of the the intended model of set theory we are referring to and a unary truth predicate which is allowed to appear in the 0 -collection and 0 -separation axiom schemas, and by adding compositional axioms such as (CT∧) to it. 11 It is relatively easy to see that:
Proof. The proof is by ω-induction on the length of the derivation in ZF. The truth of all the finitely many axioms of ZF is obtained from the provability in CT[KPω] of the Tarskian uniform disquotation scheme for L ∈ , i.e. T-biconditionals for formulas containing free variables. The truth of the schemas of ZF at each substitutional instance is provable in CT [KPω] in the manner of (2), that is via suitable instances of the extended schemas of At any rate, the proof is again only possible because the schemas of our truth theory have instances that entail the truth of the schemas of the object theory at each substitutional instance. Let us reinforce this point: having ω-induction for the language of the base theory extended to semantic vocabulary is a property of our metatheory. We want in fact to allow ourselves with syntactic arguments involving the notion of truth. However, we only get the necessary ω-induction as a theorem of the object theory because the metatheory is assumed to be part of KPω.
The theories of truth with disentangled syntax will solve the ambiguities that led to Propositions 1.2 and 1.3. In our informal reasoning we in fact implicitly distinguish between a sort of variables ranging over syntactic objects, and a sort of variables ranging over the domain of discourse of our object theory. §2. The theory CTD [O] . In the present section we introduce the three-sorted theory called CTD [O] , standing for 'compositional truth with disentangled syntax' for the object 11 For a more detailed presentation of Tarskian truth over set theory, see Fujimoto (2012, pp.13ff) .
KPω is treated extensively in Barwise (1975) . We employ KPω as object theory in our example as we know that it is a safe place in which we can develop the syntax for L ∈ and prove that many useful syntactic notions are 1 -definable. 12 See for instance Barwise (1975, p.17). theory O. CTD [O] is a generalization of the compositional system already presented in Heck (2009) for the case in which the base theory is an arithmetical theory. We first fix some notation. T is finitely axiomatizable if there is an axiomatization T of T whose set of nonlogical axioms is finite. More importantly, we call T schematically axiomatizable (in the sense of Feferman (1991) and Lavine (1999) ) if there is an axiomatization of T involving all substitutional instances of a finite set of schemas (X ) in which X is a free predicate variable. Examples of schematically axiomatizable theories are PA, in which each instantiation of the induction axiom can be represented by the single schema X (0) ∧ ∀x(X (x) → X (Sx)) → ∀x X(x), and ZF, where the separation and replacement axioms are similarly represented. In what follows, we will then call a theory finitely axiomatized or schematically axiomatized referring to a specific axiomatization of it.
Language and axioms of CTD[O]. The language L of CTD[O]
is a first-order, three-sorted language. We start with a set of sorts I = {o, s, sq}, standing respectively for 'mathematical objects', 'syntax', and 'sequences'. I is intended as a set of expressions whose elements are employed to label variables of L. The first sort o labels variables ranging over the domain of the object theory O, the sort s labels variables ranging over the domain of the theory of syntax, while the third sort, sq, labels variables ranging over a third domain of variable assignments, 'mixed' objects of both syntactic and mathematical nature as they associate to syntactic objects elements of the domain of discourse of O. For clarity we will employ elements of I also to label nonlogical constants of L when necessary.
Among the logical symbols of L, besides ¬, ∧, ∀, we include a disjoint family of non empty sets
of countably many variables of each sort. In what follows, we denote with v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , . . . , and occasionally with x, y, z, . . . variables in V o , with i, j, k, m, n, . . . variables ranging over the domain of our theory of syntax S, and with a, b, c, . . . , variables in V sq . Each sort of variables can be expanded with indexes as necessary.
For the sake of the present paper, we consider our theory of syntax S to be formulated in a copy of the language of arithmetic. In particular, we set L S = {0 s , S s , + s , × s }. Besides the nonlogical constants of L O and L S , L also contains nonlogical symbols of a 'mixed' nature. In particular, L comprehends two function symbols .(.) and D, both of type sq, s → o which apply to a sequence and a syntactic object and return a mathematical object, and a binary 'satisfaction' predicate Sat of type sq, s . 13 The axioms of CTD [O] are displayed in Table 1 .
contains, as its subtheories, O itself; the basic axioms of PA as axioms for the syntax S; a simple theory of sequences SQ formulated in the language L and consisting of one single axiom (axiom III.(SQ) in Table 1 ) which suffices to establish that there is at least one nonempty sequence and that given a variable assignment a we can always find a sequence b which differs from a only in what it assigns to one single variable; 14 and crucially the axiom of mathematical induction Ind s for syntactic variables open to Table 1 . Axioms of CTD [O] (I) Axioms of O (II) Axioms of S (basic axioms of PA) (III) Axiom for sequences of variable assignments:
(IV) Axioms for denotation and satisfaction:
where k is an individual variable of L S and ϕ is a formula of L arbitrary formulas of L. The choice of arithmetic as the theory of syntax allows us to obtain in one step the formalization of the syntax of L O within CTD [O] . 15 In particular, under a canonical Gödel numbering of L O -expressions, we assign to the primitive symbols v, c,
Then in L S , in which a primitive recursive pairing function is available (as well as its inverses) such that (k, l) = n → k, l < n, we set
. In order to generate syntactic codes for complex expressions we set: In what follows, we will employ some notational shortcuts: as we already did in the last paragraph, we will employ r , s, t, . . . as ranging over elements of the set
, and we will quantify directly over formulas between Gödel corners so that
The substitution function expressing the result of formally substituting all free occurrences of the variable v k in the formula ϕ with the code, within L S , of the term t ∈ Term L O can be defined in such a way that
We will write ϕ[t/v k ] for sub s ( ϕ , k, t ), when it is clear that we are working in S. We denote by ϕ[t 1 /v 1 , . . . , t n /v n ] the result of simultaneously substituting the free variables v 1 , . . . , v n with the codes of t 1 , . . . , t n in the formula ϕ.
In §1.4 we emphasized the importance of the extended induction of CT (and of CT[I 1 ]) in establishing the claim 'all instances of the induction axiom scheme of PA are true'. There we remarked that the proofs of Proposition 1.1 and Proposition 1.2 crucially relied on a double use of the extended induction of CT[I 1 ]: one syntactic and one mathematical. Axiom Ind s is thus designed to preserve that syntactic role, while blocking the mathematical one as displayed in (2). As a consequence, once the theory of syntax is disentangled from the underlying mathematics, we are able to keep safe our capability of formulating syntactic arguments involving the notion of truth, but also to avoid any peculiar interaction between syntax and object theory leading to objectionable consequences. §3. The 'strength' of CTD[O].
'Syntactic' Reflection. As first result on CTD[O]
, we prove the so-called uniform disquotation scheme. Tarski's disquotation scheme, an essential component of his Convention T, was originally presented in the form
for each σ in the class of sentences of L O . The uniform disquotation scheme is instead defined for all formulas ϕ(v 1 , . . . , v n ) of L O with at most v 1 , . . . , v n free. We define an intermediate system:
Proof. The proof is by metatheoretic induction on the complexity of ϕ. A sublemma is required: if r is a term of L O with at most v 1 , . . . , v n free then ∀ t 1 , . . . , t n ∀a D(a, r (t 1 , . . . , t n ) ) = r (D(a, t 1 ), . . . , D(a, t n )) (4)
is provable in CTD [O] . But this is straightforward to show by induction on the complexity of r given the axioms for D. The case in which ϕ is atomic, as well as the cases of propositional connectives, then follow easily from the axioms of CTD [O] . In the crucial case of the universal quantifier, in which ϕ
For the left-to-right direction, from the axiom CTD∀ we get Sat(b, ψ(v j , t 1 , . . . , t n ) ) for all sequences b which differ from a for what they assign to the j th variable. Now by the induction hypothesis this yields Sat(a, ϕ ) ). The proof is by induction on the length of the derivations in O. The base step follows immediately from Lemma 3.1. For logical axiom schemas, it is always assumed that although we have a strict separation between syntax and mathematics, we do not want any separation between the logics behind O and CTD [O] . 16 The truth of all the instances of the logical axiom schemas is then obtained in a manner analogous to proving the truth of all instances of induction as presented in Proposition 1.2. For the induction step, as for Proposition 1.1 and Proposition 1.2, we need a syntactic inductive argument involving the notion of truth. This is exactly what axiom the Ind s enables. In particular, the claim follows by Ind s applied to the formula ∀y < x(Proof s P A (y) → ∀a(Sat(a, end s (y)))), that is the formulation of (1) in the language L S .
We denote the 'syntactic' global reflection principle for O with GRP s O . By employing the same notation, Proposition 3. As anticipated in §1.4, if O is schematically axiomatized there is no result equivalent to Proposition 3.2. Indeed we can actually prove that such a result is impossible. The next two theorems prove this for two well-known systems, Zermelo Fraenkel set theory and Peano Arithmetic. Heck (2009) contains a different proof of the claim in which PA is the object theory, although the proof below is somewhat stronger as Heck's theory does not have the full strength of the induction axiom Ind s . THEOREM 3.4. CTD[ZF] GRP s ZF We standardly define the cumulative hierarchy V α and the constructible hierarchy L α by transfinite induction so that
where Ord denotes the class of all ordinals. It is well-known that L ω = V ω .
Proof. We will show that CTD [ZF] does not prove the syntactic consistency statement Con s ZF . The unprovability of GRP s ZF follows immediately from this fact by modus tollens. Assume for contradiction that CTD[ZF] proves Con s ZF . By compactness, there is a finite subset of CTD [ZF] in which only finitely many occurrences of the axiom schemas of CTD [ZF] occur-that is of axiom Ind s , separation and replacement in L ∈ . Let us call CTD * [U ] this system, where U is the resulting finite subsystem of ZF. By the reflexivity of ZF, there is, provably within ZF, some α such that V α U . From V α we construct a many-sorted structure D modeling CTD * [U ], by combining it with a model L ω for our syntax S, a model for the sequences of variable assignments ω V α (i.e. the set of finite sequences of elements of V α ), and by interpreting the function a(i) as the function that applied to a sequence s of elements of V α yields its i th element. 17 The extension of the satisfaction predicate is then standardly defined as the set
Now by assumption, we have, provably in ZF, that D Con s ZF and, in particular, that L ω Con s ZF , as all quantifiers in Con s ZF are of syntactic sort. Now the relation V ω Con s ZF is ZF 1 , 18 and thus absolute across transitive models. Since we may safely assume that V ω ⊂ V α , we can also conclude that V α satisfies the relativization to V ω of the syntactic consistency statement for ZF, that is the actual consistency statement for ZF in the sense of V α . Now by the first-order reflection principle for ZF, we conclude that ZF Con o ZF , which yields a contradiction by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.
A similar result, although obtained by resorting to a different proof, holds for the case in which the object theory is PA. We first introduce an essential component of the argument: DEFINITION 3.5. ACA 0 is the system formulated in the language L 2 of second-order arithmetic whose axioms are the basic axioms of PA, the induction axiom 0 ∈ X ∧ ∀n(n ∈ X → Sn ∈ X ) → ∀n(n ∈ X ) (Ind 2 ) 17 Here we are employing the well-known fact that defining an interpretation from the language L T of the theory T into the theory S is equivalent to defining in each model M S a model N T with N ⊂ M . 18 Actually KPω
where n is a number variable and X is a set variable, and the arithmetical comprehension scheme
where again Y is a set variable and ϕ(n) does not contain second-order quantification nor free occurrences of Y .
THEOREM 3.6. CTD[PA] GRP s PA Proof. As before we assume for contradiction that CTD[PA] proves Con s PA . There is thus a finite susbsystem CTD * [U ] of CTD [PA] which is consistent with Con s PA . Now the result is a consequence of the following lemma. Let ACA M 0 be the system whose axioms are exactly the axioms of ACA 0 but the language L 2 of second-order arithmetic is expanded by a set constant M which is allowed to appear into the comprehension scheme of ACA 0 . We express with Mod X (Y ) the predicate, definable within ACA 0 , that signifies that Y is a model of the set X of sentences of a first-order language. 19
the range of L variables. In particular, resorting to the official list of variables of L-i.e., by denoting with v o i variables from L U , with v s i individual variables of L S , and with v sq i sequences of L S Q -we will force our translation π to have some built-in mechanism for renaming bound variables such that v o i is always renamed as v 3i , v s i as v 3i+1 and v sq i as v 3i+2 . We then define the range of variables of L by means of the formulas
where |M| is the domain of the model M of U and ω |M| denotes the set of codes of finite sequences of M-objects, a set definable in ACA 0 by arithmetical comprehension. Clearly ACA M 0 + U + Mod U (M) shows the formulas above define nonempty domains. Besides identity, which is preserved in the translation, π assigns to each nonlogical symbol of L a corresponding formula in the target theory such that:
So for instance to the binary function symbol S o of L U π(·) assigns the formula Sv 3 = v 6 , where v 3 , v 6 are new variables ranging over elements of |M| replacing v o 1 , v o 2 . (ii) similarly, to each n-ary function symbol g of L S is assigned a formula of L o 2 such that
where val designates the arithmetical evaluation function, such that ACA M 0 + U + Mod U (M) proves: Simpson (2009) for the definition of Mod X (Y ) in RCA 0 .
(iv) to the predicate Sat of L, π(·) assigns the L o 2 -formula M(v 3i+1 [v 3i+2 ]) = 1, where x[y] expresses the result of formally substituting each occurrence of the i th free variable in the formula coded by x by the i th element of the finite sequence of elements encoded by y and
is the function contained in the definition of the model M for the language L + U resulting from L U by expanding it with as many constants as the elements of |M| are (cfr. Simpson (2009, §II,8) 
We can thus prove that the translation π actually supports a relative interpretation of
This is established by induction on the length of a proof in CTD * [U ]. It is worth emphasizing that, in the case of the finitely many instances of axiom Ind s , we have enough arithmetical comprehension to prove the translation of those induction axioms.
Back to the proof of Theorem 3.6, by instantiating Con s PA within (7), we get
The passage from (8) to (9) is made possible only because the satisfaction predicate, and thus M according to our translation, does not occur in Con s P A . Now since U ⊆ PA, then also ACA 0 + U ⊆ ACA 0 and ACA 0 Con o U , as U is finite. Therefore, by the arithmetized completeness theorem formalized in ACA 0 , 20 we have
which combined with (10) yields ACA 0 π(Con s PA ). But π(Con s PA ), by looking at the definition of π(·) above, is, up to α-conversion, just Con o PA , which contradicts Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. Sat(a, k) ) By inspection of the proof of Proposition 3.2 we may also notice the following: The formalization, within S, of the claim that all axioms of O are true (with O schematically axiomatized), by circumventing the lack of interaction between syntactic and mathematical schemas, allows us to obtain the syntactic global reflection for O.
In the next section, we show further interesting properties of CTD [O] .
Conservativity.
We begin the present subsection with a couple of useful notions. from the cartesian product of the set of finite sequences of M -objects and of the standard model of arithmetic into the domain of M . Finally, the extension of the satisfaction predicate is defined standardly as:
where again ϕ denotes the Gödel number of the formula ϕ. A complete definition of E D would of course be carried out on the complexity of ϕ, but this creates no problems as syntactic objects are of standard length. We have thus constructed the expansion (D, 
Extending schemas of O. When the object theory O is schematically axiomatized, CTD[O]
is constructed in such a way that schemas of O are only allowed to contain formulas of L O . In Section 1 we already motivated this restriction by showing how the interaction between syntactic and mathematical instances of the schemas of O is the main responsible for the nonconservativity of the truth theory over O. However, many authors would find this restriction suspicious: once one has accepted schemas in the object language, she is also committed to accepting instances of those schemas in each expansion of the base language by new (interpreted) predicates. 23 In the present subsection we investigate the possibility of allowing arbitrary formulas belonging to the vocabulary of L to occur into schemas of O. This move would make the resulting theories nonconservative over O.
Let us consider the schemas
In the present subsection we will look at the following theories: Working within PA, we start with a suitable partial truth predicate Tr o n (x) which applies to codes of sentences of the language L of PA represented in L itself. It is important to recall, at this stage, our indexing of syntactic objects. Since we are now formalizing syntactic operations and notions on and about L within PA itself, we index them with the superscript o and we place a line over codes of L -expressions instead of putting them into Gödel corners. It is well-known that, for ϕ(x) a n -formula of L ,
where ϕ(ẋ) is short for sub o (ϕ, x, num o (x) ), that is the result of formally substituting the free variable x in the formula ϕ with the numeral for x. We claim that Tr n (v k ) ))) .
(13) (13) is provable by induction on the length of the proof in PA, with a subsidiary induction to establish the base case, both of which are available in CTD[PA] + . However, we should make sure that the following holds for all ϕ(v) in L : (14) is proved by applying Ind s to the formula
where lc s (·) represents in L S the primitive recursive function that takes a formula of L and returns the number of its logical symbols. In the proof of (13), there are two non trivial cases in which (14) plays an important role. The first of these concerns the logical axioms of PA. The second concerns the induction axioms of PA. Given an arbitrary instance of induction, x, we require to show that ∀a∀k(a(k) = x → ∃n(Sat(a, Tr n (v k ) ))).
This follows, however, from the application of Ind + to the formula: ψ(y) := ∀i, j ∀a∃n(Fml o (a(i)) ∧ a( j) = y ∧ Sat(a, Tr n (sub o (v i , v, v j )) )). (17) By instantiating an absurdity ξ of O within (13), we obtain ¬Bew o PA (ξ ), i.e. Con o PA . The way in which CTD[O] + is constructed is somewhat unnatural, at least from our point of view, as the interaction between 'mathematical' and 'syntactic' schemas, essential to prove (13), was exactly what the setting with 'disentangled syntax' wanted to avoid. At any rate, Theorem 3.14 stresses once more how essential the identification between syntax and object theory is in order for our theory of truth to be stronger than its schematically axiomatized object theory.
Coding axioms. A further strengthening of CTD[O]
concerns the addition of suitable axioms extending our bridge laws connecting the domain of the object theory O and the realm of syntactic objects. As we shall argue in the concluding section, this enrichment of CTD [O] amounts to a faithful formalization of our informal metamathematical practice. The strategy, suggested in Halbach (2011) , is reminiscent of the procedure employed in the translation of the formalization of a two-sorted scientific theory containing variables for mathematical entities and for physical entities into its nominalistically accept-able version, as presented in Burgess & Rosen (1997) . 24 Our aim is to extend CTD [O] , when O is finitely axiomatized, and CTD[O]+TAX, when O is schematically axiomatized, in such a way that any sentence of the language of S not containing semantic vocabulary which is provable from CTD [O] and CTD[O] + TAX gets mapped into an equivalent statement in the language of O. In particular, if a sentence A of L S contains syntactic information regarding L O , we want A to be mapped into a sentence σ of L O conveying the same syntactic content concerning L O . In particular, if our theory of truth with disentangled syntax proves Con s O , we want our coding axioms to be able to define a translation τ from the syntactic language L S into the object-language L O such that τ (Con Tables 2 and 3. Axiom CA3, in both cases, is particularly required as the intended model of the syntax S is always N: this means that-without CA3-in the presence of a nonstandard model of our object theory, we would not have enough resources, in our disentangled syntax, Table 2 .
to talk about all the objects in the domain of O. In particular, formulas obtained by quantification within L O over 'all sentences of L O ', 'all proofs of O' or, more in general, syntactic notions which are at least numeralwise represented in S would suffer a fatal shift in meaning when translated in their equivalent in L S . 25 However, in the presence of the other coding axioms, as we will see shortly, CA3 forces the interpretation of the syntax formalized within O obtained from the translation of the 'disentangled' syntax via coding axioms to be standard.
Under a suitable choice of O, S[O] ca would prove the equivalence of every syntactic claim with an object-theoretic equivalent. To obtain this, we first notice that C(x, n) so defined is a representation formula for S [O] in the sense of Burgess & Rosen (1997) , namely it has, besides the property expressed by CA3, also the property 
THEOREM 3.16. Let O be a theory in the language of arithmetic or set theory. Then for every formula A(k 1 , . . . , k n ) of L S with exactly n free variables, there is a L O -formula A * (x 1 , . . . , x n ) with the same number of free variables such that
Proof. The proof undergoes some minor changes if O is formulated in the language of arithmetic or if it is formulated in the language of set theory. We consider the first, more tedious case as function symbols are present in L O , but it should be immediate to see how to proceed in the simpler case. We define a translation τ of L S into L O as follows:
(i) variables occurring in L S -formulas under the translation τ are taken to range over the domain of O. As in the proof of Lemma 3.7, we can assume that our interpretation maps each variable v s i of L S to the L O -variable v 3i+1 or allow ourselves with some mechanism for α-conversion. The translation τ forms the basis for defining the formula A * . We do this by proving
Now (19) follows immediately from CA1. For (20)-right-to-left direction-we start from S o x = y. By CA3 there is a unique l such that C(y, l) and thus also C(S o x, l). But l must have the form of S s k for some k as otherwise l is 0 s , and thus, by CA1, S o x = 0 o , which is impossible, thus S s k = l. On the other hand, from ψ S s (x, y) by CA2 we have C(S o x, S s k) for some k and C(y, S s k), whence S o x = y by (18). For (21), we first prove by Ind s on l the universal closure of
The base case is a consequence of (19). For the induction step, we argue as follows: suppose l = S s l 0 , by (18) C(y 0 , l 0 ) holds for some y 0 . By (20) we deduce that S o y 0 = y. But now we can apply the induction hypothesis C(x + o y 0 , k + s l 0 ). Now by CA2 we obtain C(S o (x + o y 0 ), S s (k + s l 0 )), as required. From (23) we get (21) by applying CA3 and (18). The remaining case is similar to the case of addition. By means of (19)-(22) we see that for each formula A(k 1 , . . . , k n ) of the syntax theory S there is a formula A * (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of L O such that ∀k 1 , . . . , k n ∀x 1 , . . . , x n C(x 1 , k 1 )∧· · ·∧C(x n , k n ) → (A(k 1 , . . . , k n ) ↔ A * (x 1 , . . . , x n )) (24) (24) is established by induction on the complexity of the L S -formula A(k 1 , . . . , k n ). The atomic case is covered by (19)-(22); the cases of the propositional connectives are straightforward as well, given the definition of τ ; for the universal quantifier, i.e. when A(k 1 , . . . , k n ) is ∀k j B(k j , k 1 , . . . , k n ), with j > n, we have B * (x j , x 1 , . . . , x n ) by induction hypothesis, and by (18) we can safely generalize over the x j , as there is no other occurrence of x j in B * (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
COROLLARY 3.17. For every sentence A ∈ L S : In the next section we try to give a first philosophical assessment of the results obtained. §4. Concluding Remarks. We tried to explain why the usual way of constructing formal theories of truth, in which the theory formalizing the syntax of the language of an object theory O is contained in O itself is at best the crystallization of a widespread habit among logicians, but it cannot be counted as the unique way in which our theories can be constructed. On the contrary, we tried to provide arguments belonging to different categories in support of the thesis that a proper axiomatization of the notion of truth for O may also be set up to contain,á la Tarski, a distinct class of 'linguistic' entities denoting structural-descriptive relations among expressions of L O . In Section 2 we presented the theory CTD [O] , and in Section 3 we measured its strength and examined the properties of the theories CTD[O] + and CTD [O] ca which are obtained from CTD [O] by adding some extra-resources to it. The very formulation of CTD [O] and the results provable from its axioms seem to be relevant for philosophical purposes at least in two senses: firstly, the results on CTD [O] can contribute to the debate about the explanatory power of the notion of truth; specifically in the context of the discussion of the so-called 'conservativeness argument' against deflationism ( §4.1); moreover, CTD[O] ca offers a realization of our informal metamathematical discussion as described in §1.1 and Halbach (2011) . This latter point will be discussed in §4.2.
Conservativeness and Syntax.
We refer to the so-called conservativeness argument as the challenge to the deflationary conception of truth formulated in (Horsten 1995) , (Shapiro 1998) and (Ketland 1999) . The argument stems from the provability in CT of the Global Reflection Principle for PA and consequently of Con o PA . 27 Deflationism holds that the notion of truth is metaphysically weak, in the sense that it is not a property in a genuine sense and it does not play a substantial role in philosophical and scientific explanations. According to the conservativeness argument, if by only adding axioms characterizing the notion of truth to PA we were able to prove new theorems in the language of PA, then the notion of truth could not be counted as 'insubstantial'. As Shapiro puts it:
How thin can the notion of arithmetic truth be, if by invoking it we can learn more about natural numbers? By taking on this supposedly insubstantial, mere device for indirect endorsement, we can establish facts about the natural numbers we could not establish before. (Shapiro, 1998, pp. 499-500) From the delationist's side, Field has argued that the reason why we 'learn more about natural numbers' resides in the fact that, by extending the induction axioms of PA to contain semantic vocabulary, we are actually enhancing its mathematical potential, and there is no surprise if, by combining the resulting theory with compositional axioms for truth, we obtain a conservative extension of PA. Moreover, the theory CT , which is CT with induction restricted to arithmetical formulas, is still conservative over PA. Therefore, there is a sense in which the deflationist can accept the conservativeness requirement for deflationary acceptable theories without giving up her doctrine.
Although Field's idea has raised many objections, 28 it captures an essential point already outlined in §1.3: as remarked in Heck (2009) , in the proof of the global reflection principle for PA in CT, there are two ways in which the induction of PA is employed, one syntactic and one mathematical, as exemplified by the two instances (1) and (2). The only use of induction that we want to allow in our theory of truth is the syntactic one, as the mathematical one rests upon the fact that the syntax is contained in the object 27 Notice that, following the notation already employed in the paper, we write Con o PA , as it is a consistency statement formalized in the language of PA itself. 28 For instance, as remarked in Horsten (2011) , if we consider the extended induction axioms of CT as arithmetical axioms, then we might also consider, as base theory of CT, the theory PAT, that is PA formulated in the language L ∪ {T }. If we go this way, however, CT would still be a non conservative extension of PA.
theory and, for reasons that should be clear at this stage, we do not want to depend on this simplification in providing a sufficiently general framework for truth, at least for the specific purpose of measuring the strength of principles of truth as opposed to syntactic and mathematical principles. Moreover, some of the results presented in the previous sections seem to support Field's tenet: in particular, Proposition 3.2 and Proposition 3.8 tell us that the 'syntactic' global reflection principle for O-GRP s O -respectively when O is finitely or schematically axiomatized, is provable in our theories of truth with disentangled syntax CTD [O] and CTD[O] + TAX. However, both theories are still conservative over O. This should count as a point in favor of Field's idea, although in a very distinctive sense, namely, if we formulate things properly, without adding new mathematical power to our object theory O, our theory of truth will always be a conservative extension of O.
We will now just hint to the reasons why we think that (i) the results of this paper do not represent an easy way out for the deflationist; and (ii) the original formulation of the conservativeness argument rests upon the assumption that expressions of the object language are also fully-fledged mathematical objects, and that if our way of conceiving the axiomatization of the truth predicate has some advantages with respect to the one that we want to revise, also the conservativeness argument has to be reformulated.
Ad ( as the theory over which the deductive power resulting from the addition of the truth predicate has to be evaluated, as truth is added to our disentangled syntax plus our mathematical object theory in the same way as truth was added to the object theory PA when the syntax for L was developed within PA itself. Already at the early stage of the debate concerning the conservativeness argument the conservativeness over the underlying ontology of expressions has sometimes been considered as the main target. 29 If the antideflationist takes this route, however, she has to make sense of Theorems 3.4 and 3.6 which state that without interactions between the syntactic and the mathematical-permitted in the usual setting by the duplex role of schemata of PA and ZF-we cannot reproduce in our theory of truth the reflective reasoning supporting our acceptance of the object theory, starting with the essential reflection on the truth of the axioms of O. She might consider the possibility of adding the statement ∀k∀a(Ax s O (k) → Sat(a, k)) as a new axiom. She might then argue that this is a harmless assumption given that the provability of the Global Reflection Principle, in the usual as well as the disentangled setting, relies on the assumption of the soundness of O, and that schematically axiomatized theories are somehow a special case, whereas in the case of finitely axiomatized theories only Tarski biconditionals, which are provable in CTD [O] , are needed to reconstruct our belief in the truth of the axioms of O.
There seems thus to be a way for the anti-deflationist to interpret the results on theories of truth with disentangled syntax in a favorable way. However, a specific effort needs to be made to justify the assumption of the syntactic claim postulating the truth of the axioms of the schematically axiomatized object theory.
Ad (ii): CT proves the L PA -sentence Con o PA . So it proves that a particularly satisfactory axiomatization of our reasoning about natural numbers does not lead to contradiction when combined with classical logic. 30 How can we then "learn more about the natural 29 Cfr. Halbach (2001) and Shapiro (2002) . 30 Cfr. Hofweber (2000) . numbers" by proving the coded claim Con o PA ? It seems that what we are actually doing is to fully express our commitment in the soundness of this particular axiomatization of number theory known as PA, by means of the global reflection principle-and thus by means of our theory of truth-and the consistency statement for PA is a consequence of this commitment. But GRP s PA appears to express exactly this commitment without displaying the peculiarities related to the identification of syntactic operations and functions over expressions of L O with numbers or sets in the sense of our mathematical theory O. In particular, we do not need any interaction between the syntactic and the mathematical use of the axiom schema of induction of PA-of the kinds shown in Proposition 1.2 in §1.4to prove GRP s PA ; at the same time, more importantly, CTD [O] or CTD[O] + TAX give us new syntactic consequences with respect to S [O] . By paraphrasing Shapiro's formulation of the conservativeness argument, 31 before moving to CTD[PA]+TAX, it was still logically possible for the axioms of S[O] to be true and yet Con s PA to be false, but it is not logically possible for the axioms of CTD[PA] + TAX to be true and Con s PA false. In other words, GRP s PA has also the advantage of characterizing what our commitment to the acceptance of PA is, namely, the formal statement-not necessarily belonging to L PA -declaring the soundness of a particular axiomatization, and of measuring what the exact explanatory power of these principles is, that is a characterization of our reasoning about some portion of mathematics involving truth-theoretic and syntactic principles.
The truth predicate of CTD[O] thus allowed us to 'make commitments (about matters not involving truth) that we could not make without it', 32 without increasing our knowledge of the mathematical structure captured by the theory O. The construction of theories of truth in the style of CTD[O] certainly does not offer a definitive answer to the debate about the alleged 'insubstantiality' of truth. Nevertheless any formulation, or reformulation, of the conservativeness argument should take into account a setting that, by isolating the various components of our metamathematical reflection, seems to support an understanding of the truth predicate as a very special predicate with a pronounced logico-linguistic character.
Capturing informal metamathematical reasoning.
If we establish that a sentence σ of L O is provable in the mathematical theory O, in our informal metamathematical discussion we can conceive this claim as a syntactic relation occurring between the axioms of O, its rules of inference and the statement σ . To this relation, given standard metamathematical techniques, correspond the formal statement 
